Catholic political divisions and of the racial aspects of New York's political and cultural life from the 1960s onward. According to Zeitz, Jews saw dissent, anti-authoritarianism, and activism as Jewish values, whereas Catholics held respect for authority and community as core Catholic values. These groups' cultural norms clashed during various events and political campaigns, especially involving liberal and conservative issues.
George McGovern's failed 1972 presidential bid. Long overlooked as merely a landslide defeat, Miroff demands that McGovern's campaign receive serious consideration because, even more than the election of 1968, it signaled a turning point and "introduced the era to come (2)." He persuasively argues that the campaign of the last unabashedly liberal candidate helped to deªne the contours of the contemporary Democratic party as it transformed its base from blue-collar urban ethnics to issue-orientated suburbanites, shifted its foreign-policy position, and inºuenced its adoption of a centrist image and agenda.
Miroff avoids both the conventions of a traditional campaign study and the standard empirical analysis of political science, offering, instead, what he dubs a form of "political therapy" (7). His nuanced analysis illuminates the ambiguous and important lessons of the McGovern candidacy. Not only does it bridge disciplinary divides; it also makes the book accessible and relevant to both scholarly and nonacademic audiences.
Part I offers a narrative of the events of the campaign. Miroff reveals how McGovern through his vigorous opposition to the Vietnam War built a well-organized grassroots movement of middle-class and educated activists that led to his unlikely capture of the presidential nomination. Part II provides a thoughtful consideration of the larger meanings of the campaign, particularly the fatal ºaws in its "left-center" strategy and its formidable opposition. Miroff stresses that structural dilemmas doomed the McGovern camp, but he also convincingly contends that President Nixon's 1972 strategy-"a textbook for attack politics" (229)-provided a series of Republican successors with a "successful template" of how to distort liberalism and discredit Democratic candidates (141).
In the ªnal section, Miroff shows how that landside loss has continued to haunt the party, leaving every subsequent Democratic candidate with an "identity crisis," torn between ideological convictions and political calculations. Furthermore, he asserts that the 1972 election had a devastating effect on the politics of Gary Hart, Bob Shrum, John Podesta, and Bill Clinton, all of whom began their political careers working on McGovern's campaign and all of whom took the lessons of its failure to heart. Tracing the political odyssey of these "McGovernites," he suggests that their conscious efforts to distance themselves from the liberal image and message has produced a "muddled" centrism that may be slightly more palatable to voters but lacks the conviction and passion of their mentor (303).
Miroff conducted nearly ªfty interviews with campaign participants, including McGovern himself, enabling him to paint a candid and textured portrait. This methodological strength, nevertheless, creates a conceptual limitation. Miroff repeatedly invokes the trope of the "McGovern insurgency" and alludes to the importance of the grassroots army of suburbanites and college students, but most of his discussion focuses on the campaign's upper echelons. Shifting his vantage away from the campaign headquarters more frequently might have helped to ex-tend the important implications of his argument beyond the arena of presidential elections and into the complex political landscape of the period as a whole. Ultimately, however, Liberals' Moment proves essential reading for anyone interested in the past or future of the Democratic Party and the fate of American liberalism.
Lily (1989) . He was dissenting from the ruling by the six-justice majority in the Supreme Court that Joshua DeShaney did not have a constitutional right to state protection from child abuse. To Justice Brennan, because an abused child was dependent on state agencies for his physical safety, those agencies could be held liable when they failed to protect him. The judgment instead was that Joshua's father, not the state or individual child protectors, was responsible for the harm done to this boy since the boy was not in the custody of the state. In reaching this decision, the Supreme Court signaled that it would side with state authority against expanding legal rights for aggrieved individuals. The majority of the court drew a major distinction between irresponsible action, which could be punished, and bureaucratic inaction, for which no one could be held responsible. Brennan, however, wrote that "inaction can be every bit as abusive as power of action. I cannot agree that our Constitution is indifferent to such indifference." Joshua's father, an unemployed alcoholic, often high on cocaine, repeatedly denied having beaten his son during the fourteen months when he was under voluntary supervision by a social service agency. When Joshua ended up in a coma at Mercy Hospital in Oshkosh, doctors who ordered CT scans could see that the extensive damage to Joshua's brain was consistent with being shaken many times. They strongly doubted the father's story that Joshua had accidentally fallen down the stairs. Eventually, Joshua's father went to prison on a felony charge of child abuse. His mother, divorced from the boy's father when her son was about a year old, ªled a civil law suited against the childprotection services agency of Winnebago County, Wisconsin, for violation of her son's constitutional rights. According to the Fourteenth Amendment, a citizen cannot be deprived of liberty without due process of law. Her suit argued that social workers and their agencies had deprived Joshua of his constitutionally protected liberty by failing to act on his behalf. She decided upon this legal strategy because the state of Wis-
